Research Questions
My research in cognition has not been directed toward animal cognition, per se. Rather, I have been intrigued by the apparent inability of modern science, as I understand it, to explain subjective experience. For this discussion I will refer to it as "the problem of mind." While not the same, there is broad overlap between this problem and those of animal cognition.
My research on the problem of mind has been motivated by beliefs, in no way original with me, that:
• Far from consciousness being explained by anyone, I don't think
we even know what an adequate explanation would look like, an opinion articulated especially well by [Nagel, 1986] ;
• Probably some animals experience subjective feelings in more or less the same way that we do, though there is a gradation;
• At present we don't know how to objectively identify whether or not others, animal or human, experience subjective feelings or what those feelings are like -more or less for reasons discussed by Erwin Schrödinger [Schrödinger, 1967] as "objectivation";
• The study of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and robotics have contributed a great deal to our understanding of the problem, but have certainly not solved or "explained" it.
But it did seem to me that:
• While we are not now able to construct an artificial system that can obviously experience subjective feeling, we may still be able to evolve systems that do, using techniques that have come to be known as "evolutionary computation" [Mitchell and Taylor, 1999] .
In recent years, largely as a result of work by Rodney Brooks and his students, much of which is collected in [Brooks, 1999] , I have come to believe further, that
• For purposes of understanding cognition, especially animal cognition, and probably subjective experience, organisms are best viewed as collections of sensors, effectors and processors of limited abilities surrounding-and studded throughout-the organism, communicating primarily with other sensors, effectors or processes that are mostly nearby and mostly with limited bandwidth, functioning together as an ensemble.
This means that our cognition and subjective experience are to be understood as the collective behavior of these limited agents, acting as one. If so, then one of the most important challenges facing us, but one we can probably address in concrete terms, will be to understand how such an ensemble will function as some sort of "superorganism". In the remainder of this essay I will attempt to explain how and why I arrived at this opinion, and at the end, briefly address some of the promises and limitations it offers.
Past Research
Initially I approached the problem of mind by looking at animals that could reasonably be assumed to experience rudimentary subjectivity. We used mutant strains of Drosophila melanogaster, exploring how learning or memory-retention mutations affected habitat selection [Taylor, 1987] . These were chosen because much is known about their biology and because they are easy to grow and evolve. I soon abandoned this because it seemed difficult for me to relate to their sensory experiences; they were setting the boundary conditions on this, not I. It was too difficult to broach the subjectiveobjective problem mentioned above.
Artificial systems, however, can be made more or less complex, as desired. At that time there was enthusiasm that the "traditional" approach to artificial intelligence would provide insights to the problems of cognition. By "traditional" I mean the approach exemplified by [Newall and Simon, 1972] in their General Problem Solver (GPS) program, for example. Very simply, a cognitive system is viewed as having a snapshot of a state space encoded by symbols; there are rules by which these symbols may be manipulated; and cognition consists of searching through a sequence of manipulations of these symbols so that they will come to the desired configuration of state space in a suitably economical fashion. According to this view, problem solving by animals consists of obtaining information about their environment (describable by predicate calculus) and then manipulating this representation to obtain a desired state of affairs, again describable by predicate calculus. The animal would then follow that sequence. Cognition is the deliberation about which chain of actions is most appropriate.
There is a school of thought in evolutionary biology that views the environment as posing problems that animals need to solve and that evolution guides them toward doing so. Pursuing this approach, I developed a computer system where objects inherited certain propositions at the time they were created. Other propositions could be obtained from the environment. The objects would then act on these propositions using the rules of symbolic logic to see if they could solve problems posed by the environment. Those who did so could reproduce, those who were unable to arrive at those solutions perished without leaving offspring. The system was written in Lisp and worked only modestly well, so I did not publish it. Since that time others, especially John Koza (see [Fogel, 1998, Mitchell and ), have developed powerful Lisp-based systems for evolutionary computation termed "Genetic Programming." [Koza et al., 1992] were able to obtain some insights about (possible) reasoning by anolis lizards while they chose to pursue insects or not while foraging. Audrey Cramer, who started her research in my laboratory as a graduate student, subsequently explored how similar models of cognition might explain how vervet monkeys chose a route in their search for food [Cramer and Gallistel, 1997] .
About this time I began working with David Jefferson on a system he had developed that embodies what I feel characterizes the nature of organisms and life. We have articulated this in several papers, summarized in [Taylor and Jefferson, 1995] . Most important is the view that life is a property of processes, rather than of objects. Living beings are self-organizing processes (or even an ensemble of processes) that interact with the world around them, taking in some things and expelling others, possibly reproducing other such processes, and eventually "dying", in that they are no longer capable of self-perpetuation. Sentiments about process vs. object that influenced my thinking about this include [Whitehead, 1926] and [Birch and Cobb, 1981] , though I have been unable to reconcile certain significant differences between us. In any event, it seems likely to me that mind as we know it can be possessed only by such "living" processes or objects embodying such processes. If so, then my prior work with problem-solving had fundamental shortcomings.
Rob Collins, a student of Jefferson's, used Connection Machines -computers with tens of thousands of processors, each with its own memory and processes, to evolve populations of processes that seemed life-like, in that they could reproduce, move, die and evolve as they navigated a virtual world [Jefferson et al., 1992] . Such systems could also learn, not simply evolve, a combination that has great adaptive potential [Belew and Mitchell, 1996] .
About this time Jefferson and I became acquainted with the theories of Rodney Brooks, an MIT exponent of "Nouvelle AI". In a series of papers with titles like "Intelligence without reason" and "Elephants don't play chess" (collected in [Brooks, 1999] ) he argued that intelligent systems need to be: (1) embodied, not just simulations; (2) situated in the real world, not in simply a "demo" setting; and that (3) a subsumption architecture is the best way to control such systems. Brooks' views were heavily influenced by certain ethologists, especially [van Uexküll, 1921] . From this view "traditional AI" is incapable of capturing animal intelligence. Among other reasons, representing natural environments by traditional AI models in a way that is sufficiently rich for intelligent behavior necessitates an untenable explosion of logical manipulations. He suggested that the best way for an animal to represent its environment is to use the environment to represent itself. To test such theories one cannot use disembodied symbol manipulations, but generally need to use robots in rich environments. These robots have typically consisted of large numbers of distributed sensors, effectors and processors, each with modest abilities. None of these processors could be said to characterize the environment in any meaningful way by itself, yet collectively these systems are capable of complex coordinated actions like climbing up stairs or collecting empty soda cans from desk tops. Further, watching robots play tag or "attempt" to fetch an object comes much closer to meeting the criteria that are now used to infer subjective feeling, described in the introduction, than do computers which simply manipulate symbols. Hence we thought it worthwhile to explore whether evolving robots might contribute to studying the problem of mind.
At that time few robots were commercially available and supported. So two students in my lab, Kourosh Nafisi and Orazio Miglino, constructed a small, fairly robust robot out of c Lego blocks using a small controller board we obtained from the MIT AI lab [Miglino et al., 1994] . It resembled an early version of the c Lego Technics kits that are now sold in toy stores. It was controlled by neural nets, and populations of such nets could evolve by a variant of genetic algorithms (see [Mitchell and Taylor, 1999] ). Miglino's robot evolved fairly complex neural networks and associated behavior to circumnavigate a simple environment. Evolution of these robots was a hybrid between simulated neural nets, similar to those evolved by Collins above, and real measurements of occasional physically realized ones. We were unable to physically test all of the robots that needed to be tested each generation, because the robot was just plastic and was not sufficiently robust to withstand hours of continuous use, nor was it possible to provide power to them for fully automatic testing. To my knowledge these were the first hybrid simulated/actual robot that were evolved by evolutionary computation. Since that time, very robust robots have been developed and ways found to provide constant power [Nolfi and Floreano, 2001] . One of these, the Khepera robot, has become the workhorse of "evolutionary robotics", though even these are still very simple and require an environment so artificial that they can be regarded only as embodied, but not situated in the real world (Brooks, personal communication) .
As we attempted to reconcile these studies with those of Brooks it became evident that a critical feature of intelligent behavior by real organisms is the ability for large numbers of sensors, processors and actuators to function together as a unified ensemble. The robot is surrounded and studded with many such elements, communicating together, none of them having a complete model of the environment -certainly none that could be naturally represented by propositional calculus as the earlier AI models required -but each of them having some ability to digest and process the information they obtain locally and from nearby sensors and processors. The organism's cognition seems almost a collective consciousness, derived from the interaction of all these parts functioning as a "superorganism."
Current Research
If we are to evolve such a "collective individual" we will need to pay much more attention to just what is abstracted from the environment and communicated to other parts of the organism. A collection of sensors and processors indiscriminately pouring their electrons into a bus is not likely to achieve our goal. Instead, each sensor and processor needs to compress their experience that learning or evolution has judged to be important and transmit only that. It is especially challenging to make the experiences of different sensors and processors mutually intelligible. With a computational linguist, Edward Stabler, and student in my lab, Tracy Teal, I began to explore how such extraction and compression might be achieved. Our first work has been exclusively with symbolic systems [Teal et al., 1999, Teal and Taylor, 2000] . We are now exploring how to bind such symbols with actual experiences. Related to this, several years ago I cooperated with Takaya Arita on a study where populations of neural nets learned to acquire a common lexicon, even when they were not all able to observe the same object [Arita and Taylor, 1996] .
If this approach is more or less correct, then the challenge ahead is to learn how experiences by distributed systems in the real world are able to combine and adapt to construct a unified whole -possibly to the extent of making a "whole iguana" [Dennett, 1978] . This will necessarily involve engineering, both mechanical and electrical, and computer science with plenty of theory and real-world constructions. Probably linguistics and evolutionary theory will provide needed insights.
Phylogenetic appropriateness
The overriding question or test of this approach is one of phylogenetic appropriateness. Is in-silico life going to be sufficiently similar to in-vivo life, in the way that much in-vitro life has proven to be? Will these simpler and manipulable constructions of intelligent behavior really going to lead to an understanding of mind and cognition? Or will they merely be a diversion, albeit one that is enthralling and no doubt commercially useful, but still just a diversion, from our understanding of the deeper issues?
Though poorly understood, subjective and physical events are undeniably part of the same phenomena. "The world is given to me only once, not one existing and one perceived" [Schrödinger, 1967] . Putting aside the problem of how subjective experience is to be recognized at all, some physical systems must be capable of subjective experience and some (we believe) are not -for reasons we do not know. We are currently unable to judge just which might become capable and which will not. If a system is capable of becoming subjective by incremental changes, and if our criteria for selection is appropriate, then it should be possible to evolve systems that have subjective experiences. But what if the system is simply not capable of the physical interactions necessary to support subjective experience? A liter of oxygen, though unquestionably a physical entity, is capable of becoming solid only under the most unusual of circumstances, if at all. It might be that the silicon chips are similarly not capable of the the physical processes that must underly subjective experiences. Maybe the necessary interactions occur only between Carbon, Hydrogen and Oxygen. If that is the case, then computers and robots, as now constructed, will be phylogenetically inappropriate vehicles for studying the problem of mind.
Or maybe they will have a different sort of subjective experience. Extrapolating with the imaginative and forceful arguments of [ van Uexküll, 1934] , we can presume that the "experience" of such creations will be quite different from our own, and probably quite varied from creation to creation. There is every reason to expect that these will provide us an enormously useful testbed for studying the relation between cognition and subjective experience -perhaps even providing us evidence for other forms of conscious experience, called for by [Nagel, 1986] .
In the past few decades we have learned a lot from efforts to create computers and robots behaving in ways that might seem to require subjectivity. One need only peruse the robots on display at http://www.androidworld.com/ to be impressed by their variety and accomplishments. Most emphasis has been on human subjectivity, but there has been progress from attempts to explore intelligent behavior and subjective experience at other levels -including lizards. There is no reason to believe this progress will stop, and there is plenty of reason for optimism. Whether this category of model is truly phylogenetically appropriate or not, only time will tell.
